PCA HISTORICAL CENTER
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Historic Documents in American Presbyterian History PAUL ON WOMEN SPEAKING IN CHURCH [excerpted from The Presbyterian, 30 October 1919.] I have recently received a letter from a valued friend asking me to send
him a "discussion of the Greek words laleo and lego in such passages as
1 Corinthians 14:33-39, with special reference to the question: Does the
thirty-fourth verse forbid all women everywhere to speak or preach publicly
in Christian churches?" The matter is of universal interest, and I take
the liberty of communicating my reply to the readers of The Presbyterian.
It requires to be said at once that there is no problem with reference to
the relations of laleo and lego. Apart from niceties of merely philological
interest, these words stand related to one another just as the English words
speak and say do; that is to say, laleo expresses the act of talking, while
lego refers to what is said. Wherever then the fact of speaking, without
reference to the content of what is said, is to be indicated, laleo is used,
and must be used. There is nothing disparaging in the intimation of the
word, any more than there is in our word talk; although, of course, it can
on occasion be used disparagingly as our word talk can also—as when some
of the newspapers intimate that the Senate is given over to mere talk. This
disparaging application of laleo, however, never occurs in the New Testament,
although the word is used very frequently. The word is in its right place
in 1 Corinthians 14:33ff, therefore, and necessarily bears there its simple
and natural meaning. If we needed anything to fix its meaning, however,
it would be supplied by its frequent use in the preceding part of the chapter,
where it refers not only to speaking with tongues (which was divine manifestation
and unintelligible only because of the limitations of the hearers), but
also to the prophetic speech, which is directly declared to be to edification
and exhortation and comforting (verses 3-6). It would be supplied more pungently,
however, by its contrasting term here—"let them be silent" (verse 34).
Here we have laleo directly defined for us: "Let the women keep silent,
for it is not permitted to them to speak." Keep silent - speak: these are
the two opposites; and the one defines the other. It is important to observe,
now, that the pivot on which the injunction of these verses turns is not
the prohibition of speaking so much as the command of silence. That is the
main injunction. The prohibition of speech is introduced only to explain
the meaning more fully. What Paul says is in brief: "Let the women keep
silent in the churches." That surely is direct and specific enough for all
needs. He then adds explanatorily: "For it is not permitted to them to speak."
"It is not permitted" is an appeal to a general law, valid apart from Paul's
personal command, and looks back to the opening phrase—"as in all the
churches of the saints." He is only requiring the Corinthian women to conform
to the general law of the churches. And that is the meaning of the almost
bitter words that he adds in verse 36, in which—reproaching them for the
innovation of permitting women to speak in the churches—he reminds them
that they are not the authors of the Gospel, nor are they its sole possessors:
let them keep to the law that binds the whole body of churches and not be
seeking some newfangled way of their own. The intermediate verses only make
it plain that precisely what the apostle is doing is forbidding women to
speak at all in the church. His injunction of silence he pushes so far that
he forbids them even to ask questions; and adds with special reference to
that, but through that to the general matter, the crisp declaration that
"it is indecent"—for that is the meaning of the word—"for a woman to
speak in church." It would be impossible for the apostle to speak more directly
or more emphatically than he has done here. He requires women to be silent
at the church meetings; for that is what "in the churches" means, there
were no church buildings then. And he has not left us in doubt as to the
nature of these church meetings. He had just described them in verses 26ff.
They were of the general character of our prayer meetings. Note the words
"let him be silent in the church" in verse 30, and compare them with "let
them he silent in the churches" in verse 34. The prohibition of women speaking
covers thus all public church meetings - it is the publicity, not the formality
of it, which is the point. And he tells us repeatedly that this is the universal
law of the church. He does more than that. He tells us that it is the commandment
of the Lord, and emphasizes the word "Lord" (verse 37). The passage in 1
Timothy 2:11ff. is just as strong, although it is more particularly directed
to the specific case of public teaching or ruling in the church. The apostle
had already in this context (verse 8, "the men," in contrast with "women"
of verse 9) pointedly confined public praying to men, and now continues:
"Let a woman learn in silence in all subjection; but I do not permit the
woman to teach, neither to rule over the man, but to be in silence." Neither
the teaching nor the ruling function is permitted to woman. The apostle
says here, "I do not permit," instead of as in 1 Corinthians 14:33ff., "it
is not permitted," because he is here giving his personal instructions to
Timothy, his subordinate, while there he was announcing to the Corinthians
the general law of the church. What he instructs Timothy, however, is the
general law of the church. And so he goes on and grounds his prohibition
in a universal reason which affects the entire race equally. In the face
of these two absolutely plain and emphatic passages, what is said in 1 Corinthians
11:5 cannot be appealed to in mitigation or modification. Precisely what
is meant in I Corinthians 11:5, nobody quite knows. What is said there is
that every woman praying or prophesying unveiled dishonors her head. It
seems fair to infer that if she prays or prophesies veiled she does not
dishonor her head. And it seems fair still further to infer that she may
properly pray or prophesy if only she does it veiled. We are piling up a
chain of inferences. And they have not carried us very far. We cannot infer
that it would be proper for her to pray or prophesy in church if only she
were veiled. There is nothing said about church in the passage or in the
context. The word "church" does not occur until the 16th verse, and then
not as ruling the reference of the passage, but only as supplying support
for the injunction of the passage. There is no reason whatever for believing
that "praying and prophesying" in church is meant. Neither was an exercise
confined to the church. If, as in 1 Corinthians 14:14, the "praying" spoken
of was an ecstatic exercise - as its place by "prophesying" may suggest
- then there would be the divine inspiration superceding all ordinary laws
to be reckoned with. And there has already been occasion to observe that
prayer in public is forbidden to women in 1 Timothy 2:8, 9 - unless mere
attendance at prayer is meant, in which case this passage is a close parallel
of 1 Timothy 2:9. |