by
Paul Kjoss Helseth
Princeton Seminary was founded in 1812 in
order to defend biblical Christianity against the
perceived crisis of "modern infidelity."[1] Its founders took their
stand between the extremes of deism on the one hand and
"mysticism" (or, "enthusiasm") on the
other, and resolved "to fit clergymen to meet the
cultural crisis, to roll back what they perceived as
tides of irreligion sweeping the country, and to provide
a learned defense of Christianity generally and the Bible
specifically."[2]
Throughout the nineteenth and into the twentieth
centuries theologians from Princeton Seminary proved to
be the most articulate defenders of Reformed orthodoxy in
America. Their apologetical efforts have come under
intense critical scrutiny, however, because critics
allege that these efforts were based upon an
accommodation of theology to the anthropological and
epistemological assumptions of "the modern
scientific revolution."[3]
Scottish Common Sense Realism and Baconian inductivism
rather than the anthropological and epistemological
assumptions of the Reformed tradition were the driving
forces behind the Princeton Theology, critics contend,
despite the fact that these forces often were tempered by
the Princetonians' personal piety. Critics conclude,
therefore, that the theologians at Old Princeton Seminary
were not the champions of Reformed orthodoxy that they
claimed to be. They were, rather, the purveyors of a
theology that was bastardized by an "alien
philosophy."[4]
What, then, are we to make of this
conclusion? Were the Princeton theologians in fact
"nineteenth-century positivists who did not reject
theology"?[5] Did
they accommodate their theology, in other words, to
anthropological and epistemological assumptions that are
diametrically opposed to the anthropological and
epistemological assumptions of the Reformed tradition? I
have argued elsewhere that such a conclusion cannot be
sustained because it misses the moral rather than the
merely rational nature of the Princetonians' thought.
When Old Princeton's "intellectualism" is
interpreted within a context that rejects the faculty
psychology and insists instead that the soul is a single
unit that acts in all of its functions - its thinking,
its feeling, and its willing - as a single substance, it
becomes clear that the Princeton theologians were not
cold, calculating rationalists whose confidence in the
mind led them to ignore the import of the subjective and
the centrality of experience in religious epistemology.
They were, rather, Reformed scholars who consistently
acknowledged that subjective and experiential concerns
are of critical importance in any consideration of
religious epistemology. Indeed, they recognized that the
operation of the intellect involves the "whole
soul" - mind, will and emotions - rather than the
rational faculty alone, and as a consequence they
insisted that the ability to reason "rightly" -
i.e., the ability to see revealed truth for what it
objectively is - presupposes the regenerating activity of
the Holy Spirit on the whole soul of a moral agent. Old
Princeton's "intellectualism," in short, sprang
from an endorsement of the classical Reformed distinction
between a merely speculative and a spiritual
understanding of the gospel rather than from
accommodation to the anthropological and epistemological
assumptions of Enlightenment thought.[6]
The question arises, however, as to how
the anthropological and epistemological assumptions of
the Reformed tradition are related to the Princeton
apologetic in general and the apologetic of Benjamin B.
Warfield (1851-1921) in particular. Is not Warfield's
insistence that the Christian religion has been placed in
the world "to reason its way to its
dominion"[7] a
particularly egregious example of Old Princeton's
"rather bald rationalism"?[8] Is not Warfield's apologetical appeal
to "right reason," in other words, in fact
evidence of an accommodation of theology to the
anthropological and epistemological assumptions of an
essentially humanistic philosophy?[9] This essay argues that it is not
simply because the moral considerations that rule in the
epistemological realm also rule in the realm of
apologetics. Whereas Warfield certainly affirmed that the
primary mission of the Christian apologist "is no
less than to reason the world into acceptance of
the `truth,'"[10] he
nonetheless recognized that the "rightness" of
the apprehension that leads to the advancement of the
Kingdom is produced by the testimonium internum
Spiritus Sancti. He acknowledged, therefore, that the
labors of the apologist will be of little or no
consequence in advancing the Kingdom without the
sovereign workings of the Spirit of God, for he
recognized that only the renewed soul has the moral
capacity to see revealed truth for what it objectively
is, namely glorious. That this is the case, and that a
reorientation in how we think about "right
reason" is long overdue, will be clear after an
examination of the relationship between the objective and
the subjective in Warfield's religious epistemology.
Warfield maintained that the correct
context for understanding the relationship between the
objective and the subjective in religious epistemology is
that provided by Augustine's ontology of "theistic
Intuitionalism" and Calvin's conception of the sensus
deitatis. Whereas Augustine argued that "innate
ideas" are "the immediate product in the soul
of God the Illuminator, always present with the soul as
its sole and indispensable Light, in which alone it
perceives truth,"[11]
Calvin insisted that the knowledge of God, as a fact of
self-consciousness that is quickened by the
manifestations of God in nature and providence, "is
given in the very same act by which we know self. For
when we know self, we must know it as it is: and that
means we must know it as dependent, derived, imperfect,
and responsible being."[12]
Though Warfield conceded that there are some interesting
differences between Augustine's and Calvin's ontologies
of knowledge, he argued that their doctrines are
essentially the same simply because both acknowledge that
God is not only the God of all grace and the God of all
truth, but "the Light of all knowledge" as
well.[13] Both
acknowledge, in other words, that
man's power of attaining truth
depends . . . first of all upon the fact that God has
made man like Himself, Whose intellect is the home of
the intelligible world, the contents of which may,
therefore, be reflected in the human soul; and then,
secondly, that God, having so made man, has not left
him, deistically, to himself, but continually
reflects into his soul the contents of His own
eternal and immutable mind - which are precisely
those eternal and immutable truths which constitute
the intelligible world. The soul is therefore in
unbroken communion with God, and in the body of
intelligible truths reflected into it from God, sees
God. The nerve of this view, it will be observed, is
the theistic conception of the constant dependence of
the creature on God.[14]
While Warfield was adamant in his
insistence that the knowledge of God that is reflected
into the soul constitutes the foundational fact of human
self-consciousness, he was equally unyielding in his
contention that this knowledge is the spring of religious
expression as well. The justification for this contention
is to be found in his assertion that "Man is a unit,
and the religious truth which impinges upon him must
affect him in all of his activities, or in none."[15] On the basis of his
contention that the soul is a single unit that acts in
all of its functions as a single substance, Warfield
argued that the knowledge of God that is reflected into
the soul and quickened by the manifestations of God in
nature and providence "can never be otiose and
inert; but must produce an effect in human souls, in the
way of thinking, feeling, willing."[16] It must produce, in other words, an
effect that manifests itself first in the conceptual
formulation of perceived truth (perception
"ripening" into conception), and second in the
religious reaction of the will (broadly understood to
include emotions and volitions) to the conceptual content
of this formulated perception (". . . as is the
perception ripening into conception, so is the
religion").[17]
But if it is the knowledge of God that is
reflected into the soul that underlies the religious
reaction of the will, the question then arises as to why
there are so many forms of religious expression. The
answer to this question is to be found in Warfield's
warning against supposing that "the human mind is
passive in the acquisition of knowledge, or that the
acquisition of knowledge is unconditioned by the nature
or state of the acquiring soul."[18] While Warfield maintained that the
religious reaction of the will is determined by the
conceptual formulation of perceived truth, he insisted
that the conceptual formulation of perceived truth is
itself conditioned by the moral or "ethical
state" of the perceiving soul.[19] It is the "ethical state"
of the perceiving soul, Warfield argued, that determines
the religious reaction of the will, for it is the
"ethical state" of the knowing soul that
conditions the purity or clarity of perception and
thereby the purity or clarity of the conception that
underlies religious expression. Since knowledge is a
function of the "whole man" rather than of the
rational faculty alone, it follows that there is more
than one form of religious expression simply because the
knowledge that determines the religious reaction of the
will is qualified and conditioned by the "whole
voluntary nature" of the agent that knows.[20]
Having established that the "ethical
state" of the soul conditions the perception as well
as the conception of the mind, we must now consider how
the conception of the mind is related to the religious
reaction of the will. Why, we must ask, does "the
nature of our [theological] conceptions so far from
having nothing, [have] everything, to do with
religion"?[21] The
answer to this question is to be found in Warfield's
contention that "Religion is not only the natural,
but the necessary product of man's sense of dependence, which
always abides as the innermost essence of the whole crowd
of emotions which we speak of as religious, the
lowest and also the highest."[22] While Warfield insisted that
dependence upon God is the foundational fact of human
self-consciousness, he also maintained that the vital
manifestation of this consciousness in religion unveils
the flowering of this sense of dependence in a manner
that is determined by the moral agent's conceptual
formulation of perceived truth.[23] In this statement, however,
Warfield links religious expression with the sense of
dependence in a manner that seems to bypass the
determining role of conceptual truth. Religion, in other
words, is in this instance not explicitly recognized as
being the vital effect of the knowledge of God
in the human soul, but rather it is regarded as the necessary
product of the natural sense of dependence,
i.e., of the innermost essence of the whole crowd
of emotions that constitute the very core of human being.
How, then, does Warfield reconcile what might appear to
be a contradiction at this point? How, in other words,
can Warfield maintain that religion is both the vital
effect of the knowledge of God in the human
soul and the necessary product of the natural sense
of dependence without appearing to suggest that
religious expression has its origin in more than one
source (i.e., one rational/objective and one
emotional/subjective source)? The answer to this
question, as well as an understanding of the nature of
the relationship between the conception of the mind and
the religious reaction of the will, is to be found in a
cursory analysis of the mental movement called faith.
In response to the notion that
responsibility attaches to faith only when the act of
faith springs from the "free volition" of an
autonomous moral agent, Warfield argued that we are
responsible for our faith simply because faith - from its
lowest to its highest forms - is an act of the mind the
subject of which is "the man in the entirety of his
being as man."[24]
While Warfield acknowledged that the mental movement
called faith "fulfills itself," i.e., is
specifically "formed," in that voluntary
movement of the sensibility called trust, he insisted
that the act of faith includes - indeed is based upon -
"a mental recognition of what is before the mind, as
objectively true and real, and therefore depends on the
evidence that a thing is true and real and is determined
by this evidence; it is the response of the mind to this
evidence and cannot arise apart from it."[25] Since faith is a
mental conviction which as such is "determined by
evidence, not by volition," Warfield concluded that
the act of faith is best defined as that "forced
consent" in which "the movement of the
sensibility in the form of trust is what is thrust
forward to observation."[26]
It must be borne in mind, however, that
though Warfield insisted that the fulfillment of faith in
the movement of trust is determined or "forced"
by what is rationally perceived, he never asserted that
the consent of the mind is "the mechanical result of
the adduction of the evidence."[27] "There may stand in the way of
the proper and objectively inevitable effect of the
evidence," he argued, "the subjective nature or
condition to which the evidence is addressed."[28] But how can this be?
If faith is indeed a "forced consent," then how
can "the subjective nature or condition to which the
evidence is addressed" block "the objectively
inevitable effect of the evidence"? The answer to
this question reveals the key to understanding how the
religious reaction of the will is at one and the same
time both the vital effect of the knowledge of
God in the human soul and the necessary product
of the natural sense of dependence. Warfield
insisted that the objectively inevitable effect of the
evidence can be thwarted by the subjective nature of the
perceiving agent simply because "`Faith,' `belief'
does not follow the evidence itself . . . but the
judgment of the intellect on the evidence."[29] In Warfield's thought
the "judgment of the intellect" refers not to
an act of the rational faculty alone but rather to an act
of the mind in which the "complex of emotions"
that reflects the "ethical state" of the soul
and forms the "concrete state of mind" of the
perceiving agent plays the decisive or determining role.[30] What, then, does the
"complex of emotions" that forms the
"concrete state of mind" of the perceiving
agent do? Why, in other words, is the "judgment of
the intellect" the most prominent element in the
movement of assent, the "central movement in all
faith"?[31] It is
the most prominent element in the "central movement
in all faith," in short, because the "complex
of emotions" that forms the "concrete state of
mind" of the perceiving agent determines the
"susceptibility" or "accessibility"
of the mind to the objective force of the evidence in
question as well as the reaction of the will to what is
rationally perceived.[32]
When the "judgment of the intellect" is defined
in this fashion, or in that fashion which recognizes that
the "judgment of the intellect" is that act of
the "whole man" that "underlies" the
agent's response to perceived truth,[33] it becomes clear that the
conception of the mind is related to the religious
reaction of the will simply because the "complex of
emotions" that forms the "state of mind"
of the perceiving agent also determines the activity of
the will, broadly understood. This explains, among other
things, why "The evidence to which we are accessible
is irresistible if adequate, and irresistibly produces
belief, faith."[34]
The foregoing analysis has established
that faith is both the vital effect of the knowledge
of God in the human soul and the necessary
product of the natural sense of dependence
simply because it is the response of the "whole
man" to the knowledge of God that is reflected into
the soul and quickened by the manifestations of God in
nature and providence. The question that we must now
consider has to do with what makes the faith that informs
the religious reaction of the will "saving"
faith. If it is indeed true that "no man exists, or
ever has existed or ever will exist, who has not
`faith,'"[35] then
what for Warfield sets the faith of the elect apart from
the faith of those who are perishing? The forthcoming
discussion attempts to answer this question by
articulating the basic differences between the character
of faith in moral agents that are unfallen, fallen, and
renewed. It suggests, in short, that the regenerate form
their consciousness of dependence in a manner that
renders their salvation certain because they have the
moral ability to see revealed truth for what it
objectively is, namely glorious.
Following Augustine and Calvin, Warfield
maintained that "it is knowledge, not nescience,
which belongs to human nature as such."[36] He insisted,
therefore, that had human nature not been disordered by
the "abnormal" condition of original sin, all
moral agents - "by the very necessity of [their]
nature"[37] - not
only would have known God in the purest and most intimate
sense of the term, but they would have entrusted
themselves to His care because their consciousness of
dependence would have taken "the `form' of glad and
loving trust."[38]
The capacity for true knowledge and loving trust was
lost, however, when Adam fell into sin and thereby
plunged his posterity into a state of spiritual death.
But why, we must ask, does the abnormal state of
fallenness prohibit the fallen sinner from responding to
the consciousness of dependence in a loving and therefore
trusting fashion? The answer to this question has to do
with the "noetic as well as thelematic and ethical
effects" of the fall.[39]
Warfield argued that fallen sinners are unable to form
their consciousness of dependence in glad and loving
trust because the knowledge of God that is reflected into
their souls is "dulled," "deflected,"
and twisted by the power of sin.[40] Whereas "unfallen man"
had a compelling knowledge of God because the image and
truth of God were rightly reflected in his heart, the
fallen sinner is incapable of such knowledge and love
because the sinful heart "refracts and deflects the
rays of truth reflected into it from the divine source, so
rendering the right perception of the truth impossible."[41] As such, while
"abnormal man" remains conscious of his
dependence on God and thus believes in God in an
intellectual or speculative sense, he can neither
"delight" in this dependence nor can he trust
in the God on whom he knows he is dependent simply
because the image and truth of God are deflected by a
corrupt nature "into an object of distrust, fear,
and hate."[42]
Since, then, the fallen sinner's
consciousness of dependence is formed by fear and hate
rather than by loving trust, it follows - given the
certain nature of the relationship between moral
character and moral activity - that the fallen sinner is
unable to respond to the consciousness of dependence in a
loving and therefore trusting fashion because the sinner
as such is morally unable to do so. Herein lies
the heart of the depravity that constitutes the fallen
condition. While the fallen sinner cannot escape the
knowledge that he is and always will be totally dependent
upon God, he is morally incapable of entrusting himself
to God simply because "he loves sin too much"[43] and thus cannot use
his will - which in the narrower sense is "ready,
like a weathercock, to be turned whithersoever the breeze
that blows from the heart (`will' in the broader sense)
may direct"[44] -
for believing. Fallen sinners, therefore, will not
and cannot trust in God because the sinful heart lacks
the moral ability to "explicate" its sense of
dependence and obligation "on right lines."[45] It lacks the moral
ability to form its consciousness of dependence in loving
trust, in other words, because it cannot see revealed
truth for what it objectively is, namely glorious.[46]
But does this "abnormal" and
desperate state of fallenness preclude the possibility of
fallen sinners ever attaining to a sound knowledge of
God? And does it as such invalidate Warfield's contention
that it is the natural destiny of human nature to have a
true and therefore compelling knowledge of God? According
to Warfield, it does not for the elect because God has
supernaturally intervened to meet this desperate
condition via a two-fold provision for the removal of the
natural incapacities of fallen sinners.[47] To begin with, God has rescued
fallen sinners from their "intellectual
imbecility"[48] via
the provision of a supernatural revelation that
"supplements" and "completes" the
truth manifest in general revelation.[49] Whereas God has published an
adequate revelation of his truth in the natural
constitution of the moral agent as well as in nature and
providence, this general revelation "is insufficient
that sinful man should know Him aright" because it
is not reflected purely in minds that are blinded by sin.[50] Thus, as the remedy
for this inability to know God aright God has given to
fallen sinners a revelation adapted to their needs. It is
this special revelation, the purpose of which is to
"neutralize" the noetic effects of sin by
providing a "mitigation for the symptom," which
as such serves as the objective preparation for the
"proper assimilation" of the knowledge of God
manifest in general revelation.[51] "What special revelation is,
therefore - and the Scriptures as its documentation - is
very precisely represented by the figure of the
spectacles. It is aid to the dulled vision of sinful man,
to enable it to see God."[52]
While special revelation as such is
"the condition of all right knowledge of higher
things for sinful man,"[53]
it is clear that this revelation alone - its objective
adequacy notwithstanding - will not yield a true and
compelling knowledge of God if the soul to which it is
addressed is morally incapable of perceiving and
receiving it. This is due to the fact that sinners who
are at enmity with God need more than external aid to see
God, they need "the power of sight."[54] They need, in other
words, a remedy for their moral bondage to sin so that
"the light of the Word itself can accredit itself to
them as light."[55]
Wherein, then, is this remedy to be found? Again
following Augustine and Calvin, Warfield insisted that it
is to be found generally in the second provision for the
recovery of fallen sinners to their natural/normal
condition, namely the provision of divine grace, and
specifically in the central component of this provision,
namely the testimonium internum Spiritus Sancti.
Whereas the subjective corruption of the fallen sinner's
moral nature precludes the possibility of a
"hospitable reception" for the truth of God in
the perceiving mind and heart,[56] Warfield insisted that the
subjective testimony of the Spirit renders the perception
and reception of the truth certain because the internal
operation of the Spirit radically alters the moral
condition and thereby the certain operation of the whole
soul. This is due to the fact that the testimony of the
Spirit changes the governing disposition or character of
the soul by renewing and inclining the powers of the soul
"in the love of God," i.e., in an affinity for
the image and truth of God reflected into the soul, and
in an affinity for the consciousness of dependence on
God.[57] As such, the
chosen recipients of this regenerating grace perceive and
receive the truth of God simply because they have been
enabled by grace to love rather than hate the things of
God, i.e., to "feel, judge, and act differently from
what [they] otherwise should."[58] As a consequence, "[they]
recognize God where before [they] did not perceive Him;
[they] trust and love Him where before [they] feared and
hated Him; [and they] firmly embrace Him in His Word
where before [they] turned indifferently away."[59]
Yet how, specifically, does the
subjective testimony of the Holy Spirit render the
perception and reception of the truth certain? Why, in
other words, is the witness of the Spirit effectual?
Warfield maintained that the internal operation of the
Spirit accomplishes its ordained end precisely because it
implants, or rather restores, "a spiritual sense in
the soul by which God is recognized in His Word."[60] This restoration of
susceptibility to spiritual truth then has two certain
effects. First, it enables regenerated sinners to reason
"rightly." Warfield argued that while this
spiritual sense is not revelation in the strict sense of
the term, it "is just God Himself in His intimate
working in the human heart, opening it to the light of
the truth, that by this illumination it may see things
as they really are and so recognize God in the
Scriptures with the same directness and surety as men
recognize sweetness in what is sweet and brightness in
what is bright."[61]
In spite of the fact that the work of the Spirit
"presupposes the objective revelation and only
prepares the heart to respond to and embrace it," it
nonetheless is the source of all our "right
knowledge" of God because it is the means by which
fallen sinners are enabled to "see" through the
spectacles of Scripture, i.e., to "discern" the
beauty and truthfulness of the Word.[62] It is herein, then, i.e., in the
"conjoint divine action" of Word and Spirit, of
objective and subjective, that the "keystone"
of Warfield's doctrine of the knowledge of God is to be
found.[63]
While the subjective testimony of the
Spirit is the immediate means by which regenerated
sinners are enabled to see and know things "as they
really are," it is also the less direct though no
less effectual means to the rise of saving faith in the
regenerated soul. On the basis of his commitment to the
unitary operation of the soul, Warfield insisted that a
"right" knowledge of the Gospel will
immediately and irresistibly manifest itself in an act of
saving faith simply because the sense that immediately
informs the perception of the mind is the same sense that
ultimately determines the activity of the will, broadly
understood. As such, saving faith is the certain
manifestation of the ability to reason
"rightly" because the knowledge of God that is
communicated to the regenerated soul via the
"conjoint divine action" of Word and Spirit is
not a knowledge that occupies the intellect alone. It is,
rather, a "vital and vitalizing knowledge of
God" that "takes hold of the whole man in the
roots of his activities and controls all the movements of
his soul."[64] We
must acknowledge, therefore, that the testimony of the
Spirit renders both true knowledge and saving faith
absolutely certain because it is the implanted sense of
the divine that "forces" regenerated sinners to
see and pursue that which they perceive (rightly) to be
both true and trustworthy.[65]
Given Warfield's understanding of the
relationship between the objective and the subjective in
religious epistemology and in light of his clear
endorsement of the notion that the soul is a single unit
that acts in all of its functions as a single substance,
we must conclude our analysis of Warfield's religious
epistemology by making one final assertion. Warfield's
repudiation of the modern era's relocation of the
divine-human nexus was not based upon a rationalistic -
and therefore heterodox - reliance upon external
authority. His repudiation was based, rather, upon the
desire to preserve two important elements of the
Princeton tradition in an increasingly subjectivistic
age: the objective basis of Christian faith and the
enduring veracity of the distinction between a merely
speculative and a spiritual understanding of the Gospel.
First, Warfield rejected the modern era's relocation of
the divine-human nexus because its overt subjectivism
relegated the role of theology - i.e., the role of the
conceptual formulation of perceived truth - to a place of
secondary significance and thereby violated what for
Warfield was the foundational axiom of Christian
anthropology, namely the primacy of the intellect in
faith. "Christianity is not a distinctive
interpretation of a religious experience common to all
men," Warfield argued, "much less is it an
indeterminate and constantly changing interpretation of a
religious experience common to men; it is a
distinctive religious experience begotten in men by a
distinctive body of facts known only to or rightly
apprehended only by Christians."[66]
Second, although Warfield was unyielding
in his defense of the primacy of the intellect in faith,
he nonetheless recognized that there is more to a saving
knowledge of the truth than the rational appropriation of
objective evidence. Because he was convinced that the
moral or "ethical state" of the knowing soul
determines both the quality of perception and the quality
of conception, Warfield maintained there is "a
shallower and a deeper sense of the word `knowledge' - a
purely intellectualistic sense, and a sense that involves
the whole man and all his activities."[67] While he eagerly
admitted that all moral agents are religious beings
because all moral agents "know God" in at least
an intellectual sense, he emphasized that only
regenerated sinners know God in the deeper sense because
it is only in the souls of the regenerate that there is a
"perfect interaction" between the objective and
the subjective factors that impinge upon religious
epistemology and that underlie religious life and
practice.[68] We must
conclude, therefore, that all charges of rationalism are
unfounded and without merit because Warfield recognized
that the operation of the intellect involves the
"whole man" rather than the rational faculty
alone, and as a consequence he distinguished between a
merely speculative and a spiritual understanding of the
Gospel. While he acknowledged that "It may be
possible to speculate on `the essence' of God without
being moved by it," he clearly affirmed that
"it is impossible to form any vital conception of
God without some movement of intellect, feeling, and will
towards Him; and any real knowledge of God is inseparable
from movements of piety towards Him."[69]
Given Warfield's endorsement of the
classical Reformed distinction between a merely
speculative and a spiritual understanding of the gospel,
and in light of his insistence that true knowledge and
saving faith presuppose the "perfect
interaction" of the objective and subjective factors
that impinge upon religious epistemology and underlie
religious life and practice, the question that we must
finally consider has to do with how we should approach
Warfield's apologetical effort to "investigate,
explicate, and establish" that knowledge of God
"which Christianity professes to embody and seeks to
make efficient in the world."[70] Must we conclude, along with the
consensus of critical opinion, that Warfield was a
rationalist whose approach to apologetics was built upon
an almost "Pelagian confidence"[71] in the moral competence of even the
unregenerate mind? Must we conclude, in other words, that
Warfield's apologetic sprang from an accommodation of
theology to anthropological and epistemological
assumptions that are diametrically opposed to the
anthropological and epistemological assumptions of the
Reformed tradition? The remainder of this essay argues
that we must not unless we want to seriously misrepresent
Warfield's approach to apologetics. While Warfield
consistently maintained that saving faith is a mental
conviction which as such is grounded in the rational
appropriation of objective truth rather than the
ineffable religious experience of a fallen moral agent,
he nonetheless recognized that the truth that is the
ground of faith cannot produce saving faith apart from
the testimonium internum Spiritus Sancti.[72] "It is beyond all
question," Warfield argued, that "only the
prepared heart . . . can fitly respond to the `reasons'
[i.e., `evidences']; but how can even a prepared heart
respond, when there are no `reasons' [i.e., `evidences']
to draw out its action?"[73]
Since Warfield insisted that "Objective adequacy and
subjective effect are not exactly correlated,"[74] we must conclude that
he was not a rationalist who was hopelessly wed to
the anthropological and epistemological assumptions of
Enlightenment thought. He was, rather, a Reformed scholar
who sought to retain a place for the objective in
religious epistemology and to remain faithful to the
foundational principle of Augustinian and Reformed piety
- namely that "It is God and God alone who saves,
and that in every element of the saving process"[75] - by grounding the
gift of saving faith in the ability to reason
"rightly."
Yet if saving faith is a mental
conviction which as such is grounded in the spiritual
perception of objective truth rather than the ineffable
religious experience of a fallen moral agent, then how
are we to understand the offensive mission of the
Princeton apologetic? More specifically, how can we
rescue Warfield from the charge of rationalism when he
explicitly argues that the Christian religion "has
been placed in the world to reason its way to the
dominion of the world"?[76]
I contend that a correct understanding of Warfield's
approach to apologetics will elude interpreters as long
as they fail to keep two important matters in mind.
First, they will never correctly understand what Warfield
was trying to accomplish through his evidentialist
apologetic as long as they stubbornly insist that his
appeal to "right reason" was an appeal "to
the natural man's `right reason' to judge of the
truth of Christianity."[77]
This essay has established that the ability to reason
"rightly" - i.e., the ability to see revealed
truth for what it objectively is, namely glorious -
presupposes the regenerating activity of the Holy Spirit
on the "whole soul" of a moral agent.
Warfield's appeal to "right reason," therefore,
was not an appeal to the unbeliever's neutral reasoning
to judge of the truth of Christianity, but rather an
appeal to the regenerate reason of the Christian
apologist. Since "right reason" is the
offensive weapon of the Christian apologist rather that
the "self-established intellectual tool" of the
autonomous natural man,[78]
it follows that the Christian religion will "reason
its way to its dominion" not because Christians have
"unbounded confidence in the apologetic power of the
rational appeal to people of common sense,"[79] but rather because
they recognize that "the Christian view of the
world" is true and that they have no reason to fear
the "contention of men."[80]
The Christian, by virtue of the
palingenesis working in him, stands undoubtedly on an
indefinitely higher plane of thought than that
occupied by sinful man as such. And he must not
decline, but use and press the advantage which God
has thus given him. He must insist, and insist again,
that his determinations, and not those of the
unilluminated, must be built into the slowly rising
fabric of human science.[81]
Second, a correct understanding of
Warfield's apologetic will also elude interpreters if his
endorsement of the distinction between a merely
speculative and a spiritual understanding of the gospel
is not allowed to qualify his contention that
"rational argumentation does, entirely apart from
that specific operation of the Holy Ghost which produces
saving faith, ground a genuine exercise of faith."[82] While Warfield
recognized that only regenerated sinners can exercise
saving faith because only regenerated sinners have
"that keen taste for the divine" that
penetrates to the spiritual excellence of what is
rationally perceived, he nonetheless insisted that
"`faith in God' is natural to man" because all
moral agents necessarily react to the knowledge of God
that is reflected into their souls.[83] All moral agents react, in other
words, to the grounds of faith that are present to their
consciousness. Since the testimonium internum Spiritus
Sancti is not necessary to produce faith but only to
give to faith "that peculiar quality which makes it
saving faith,"[84]
it follows that through his apologetic Warfield was
simply trying to "produce in the sinner that form of
conviction we call faith, by the presentation of the
evidence on which it rests."[85] While he acknowledged that the
apologist cannot produce the "form" of faith
that faith takes in the regenerated sinner, he
nonetheless insisted that it is the task of the apologist
to "urge `his stronger and purer thought'
continuously, and in all its details, upon the attention
of men," in order that a fides humana - i.e.,
an historical faith - might be established.[86] As Andrew Hoffecker
has incisively noted, the underlying assumption of this
approach to apologetics is of course that the Spirit -
who blows where He wills - will enable the elect to see
revealed truth for what it objectively is, thereby
rendering their saving response to the truth certain.[87]
Having established that Warfield's
approach to apologetics involves both an explicit appeal
to the "better science"[88] of the Christian apologist as well
as an implicit appeal to the sovereign workings of the
Spirit of God, we must conclude that the Princeton
apologetic is best characterized as that foundational
enterprise that attempts to establish the objective
foundations of Christian faith through the superior
science of redeemed thought, and thereby to facilitate
the fallen sinner's engagement in the most basic activity
of human existence, namely reaction to the truth of God
that is reflected into his/her soul. "If it is
incumbent on the believer to be able to give a reason for
the faith that is in him," Warfield argued, "it
is impossible for him to be a believer without a reason
for the faith that is in him; and it is the task of
apologetics to bring this reason clearly out in his
consciousness, and make its validity plain."[89]
In closing, when Warfield's apologetical
response to the modern era's relocation of the
divine-human nexus is interpreted within the context of
his insistence that the act of saving faith is "a
moral act and the gift of God" as well as an act
with "cognizable ground in right reason,"[90] it becomes clear that
he was not a rationalist who naively insisted that a
saving knowledge of the truth can be attained merely
through the rational appropriation of objective evidence.[91] He was, rather, a
Reformed scholar who recognized that because the
operation of the intellect involves the "whole
soul" rather than the rational faculty alone, the
"taste for the divine" that informs the ability
to reason "rightly" and leads to the
fulfillment of faith in the movement of trust
"cannot be awakened in unbelievers by the natural
action of the Scriptures or any rational arguments
whatever, but requires for its production the work of the
Spirit of God ab extra accidens."[92]
This is historically significant not only
because it neutralizes the frankly irresponsible claim
that Warfield and his colleagues at Old Princeton gave
the back of their collective hand to the subjective and
experiential components of religious epistemology,[93] but also because it
calls into question how we should think about Warfield's
approach to apologetics in relation to the ongoing debate
within the Reformed camp over apologetical method. Given
the fact that "right reason" is the offensive
weapon of the Christian apologist rather than the
"self-established intellectual tool" of the
autonomous natural man, is it possible that there is more
in common between the apologetical approaches of Warfield
and Cornelius Van Til than partisans on both sides of the
apologetical divide are willing to admit? I take up this
question in the next issue of Premise by
interacting with an article by the late Dr. Greg Bahnsen
on the apologetical tradition of the Orthodox
Presbyterian Church. Whereas Dr. Bahnsen argues that
there is a "harmony of perspective" between the
apologetical approaches of J. Gresham Machen and
Cornelius Van Til because Machen "moved away from
the old Princeton conception of apologetics in a
presuppositional direction,"[94] I contend that if there is in fact
a "harmony of perspective" between Machen and
Van Til there is harmony only because Machen stood
squarely in the tradition of Old Princeton. The
plausibility of this claim, which I substantiate in my
forthcoming essay, is suggested by the following
quotation from Machen's personal correspondence with a
Dutch Calvinist by the name of Gerrit Hospers. "You
will not take it amiss," Machen writes,
that I still agree rather strongly
with Dr. Warfield about the place of apologetics. It
is quite true that the human reason because of the
noetic effects of sin needs the Spirit of God in
order to accept the truth of the reservation [sic]
which God has given, but because the arguments for
the truth of the Christian religion are insufficient
to produce Christian conviction, it does not follow,
I think, that they are unnecessary. On the contrary,
it seems to me that they constitute one of the means
which the Spirit of God uses in the production of
Christian conviction and the conversion of the
sinner.[95]
Endnotes
[1]Mark
Noll, "The Founding of Princeton Seminary," Westminster
Theological Journal 42 (Fall 1979): 85.
[2]Mark Noll, "The
Princeton Theology," in The Princeton Theology,
Reformed Theology in America, edited by David Wells, no.
1 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1985; reprint, Grand Rapids:
Baker, 1989), 24.
[3]George Marsden,
"The Collapse of American Evangelical
Acedemia," in Faith and Rationality: Reason and
Belief in God, edited by Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas
Wolterstorff (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame, 1983), 241.
[4]This is the general
theme of John Vander Stelt's Philosophy and Scripture:
A Study in Old Princeton and Westminster Theology
(Marlton, NJ: Mack Publishing Co., 1978).
[5]George Marsden,
"Scotland and Philadelphia: Common Sense Philosophy
from Jefferson to Westminster," Reformed
Theological Journal (March 1979): 11.
[6]The Princeton
theologians endorsed an understanding of Christian
anthropology known as Realistic Dualism. According to the
doctrine of Realistic Dualism, the soul is a single unit
that necessarily acts as a single substance. It is
comprised of two rather than three faculties: the
understanding, which takes precedence in all rational
activity, and the will, which is broadly defined to
include the emotions and volitions. The will, moreover,
is not a self-determining power, but rather a power that
is determined by the motives of the acting agent. For an
excellent analysis of the doctrine of free agency that
flows from this anthropology, see Paul Ramsey's
introductory essay to Jonathan Edwards, The Freedom of
the Will (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957),
especially 38-40. For an excellent statement of the
distinction between a merely speculative and a spiritual
understanding of the gospel, see Jonathan Edwards,
"Christian Knowledge," in Jonathan Edwards
On Knowing Christ (Edinburgh: Banner of Truth, 1990),
9-30. For an extensive analysis of the issues addressed
in this paragraph, see my dissertation, "Moral
Character and Moral Certainty: The Subjective State of
the Soul and J. G. Machen's Critique of Theological
Liberalism" (Ph.D. Marquette University, 1996),
chapters one and two; and my article, "The
`Intellectualism' of Old Princeton: A Question of
Epistemological Context" Princeton Theological
Review 4, 1 (February 1997): 42-49.
[7]B. B. Warfield,
"Introduction to Francis R. Beattie's Apologetics,"
in Selected Shorter Writings of Benjamin B. Warfield,
edited by John E. Meeter, 2 vols. (Nutley, NJ:
Presbyterian and Reformed, 1970 and 1973), II: 98-99.
[8]William Livingstone,
"The Princeton Apologetic as Exemplified by the Work
of Benjamin B. Warfield and J. Gresham Machen: A Study in
American Theology, 1880-1930" (Ph.D. Yale
University, 1948), 186.
[9]For this appeal, see
Warfield, "Introduction to Francis R. Beattie's Apologetics,"
in Shorter Writings, II: 99-100, and B. B.
Warfield, "A Review of De Zekerheid des Geloofs,"
Shorter Writings, II: 120-121.
[10]B. B. Warfield,
"Christianity the Truth," Shorter Writings,
II: 213.
[11]B. B. Warfield,
"Augustine's Doctrine of Knowledge and
Authority," Tertullian and Augustine, vol.
IV, The Works of Benjamin Breckinridge Warfield
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1930; reprint, Grand
Rapids: Baker, 1991), 143-144.
[12]B. B. Warfield,
"Calvin's Doctrine of the Knowledge of God," Calvin
and Calvinism, vol. V, The Works of Benjamin
Breckinridge Warfield (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1931; reprint, Grand Rapids: Baker, 1991), 31. Cf.
B. B. Warfield, "God and Human Religion and
Morals," Shorter Writings, I: 41-45.
[13]Warfield,
"Augustine's Doctrine of Knowledge and
Authority," 143.
[14]Ibid., 145-146. On
the differences between Augustine's and Calvin's
ontologies of knowledge, see "Calvin's Doctrine of
the Knowledge of God," 117.
[15]B. B. Warfield,
"Authority, Intellect, Heart," Shorter
Writings, II: 668. Anyone who doubts that Warfield
endorsed the doctrine of Realistic Dualism should read
this short yet extremely important essay.
[16]Warfield,
"Augustine's Doctrine of Knowledge and
Authority," 37.
[17]B. B. Warfield,
review of Foundations: A Statement of Christian Belief
in Terms of Modern Thought, by Seven Oxford Men, in Critical
Reviews, vol. X, The Works of Benjamin
Breckinridge Warfield (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1932; reprint, Grand Rapids: Baker, 1991), 325;
cf. B. B. Warfield, "The Idea of Systematic
Theology," Studies in Theology, vol. IX, The
Works of Benjamin Breckinridge Warfield (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1932; reprint, Grand Rapids:
Baker, 1991), 53-54; Warfield, "Calvin's Doctrine of
the Knowledge of God," 37-38.
[18]Warfield,
"Augustine's Doctrine of Knowledge and
Authority," 149. On the soul acting as a single
substance, cf. 150-151.
[19]Ibid., 149, note 37.
Cf. Warfield, "Calvin's Doctrine of the Knowledge of
God," 31-32, 38; B. B. Warfield, "Augustine and
the Pelagian Controversy," Tertullian and
Augustine, 295-296, 401-404.
[20]Warfield,
"Augustine's Doctrine of Knowledge and
Authority," 149, note 37; cf. Warfield,
"Augustine's Doctrine of Knowledge and
Authority," 149-150.
[21]B. B. Warfield, The
Power of God Unto Salvation (Philadelphia: The
Presbyterian Board of Publishing and Sabbath-School Work,
1903), 243-244.
[22]Warfield, "God
and Human Religion and Morals," Shorter Writings,
I: 42. Emphasis added.
[23]Cf. B. B. Warfield,
"On Faith in its Psychological Aspects," Studies
in Theology, 338.
[24]Ibid., 341.
[25]Ibid., 342, 315.
[26]Ibid., 317, 331.
[27]Ibid., 314, 336.
[28]Ibid.
[29]Ibid., 318.
[30]Ibid., 314, 331. For
more on the "judgment of the intellect" and the
"complex of emotions" that form the
"concrete state of mind" of the perceiving
agent, see Helseth, "Moral Character and Moral
Certainty," 89, note 71.
[31]Warfield, "On
Faith in its Psychological Aspects," 341. The
movement of assent is the central movement in faith
because it "must depend" on a prior movement of
the intellect, and the movement of the sensibilities in
the act of "trust" is the "product"
of assent. Thus assent ties together the intellectual and
the volitional aspects of faith. Cf. 341-342.
[32]Ibid., 336-337; cf.
B. B. Warfield, review of The Christian Faith: A
System of Dogmatics, by Theodore Haering, in Critical
Reviews, 412.
[33]Warfield, "On
Faith in its Psychological Aspects," 314.
[34]Ibid., 336.
[35]Ibid., 338.
[36]Warfield,
"Augustine's Doctrine of Knowledge and
Authority," 158.
[37]Warfield,
"Calvin's Doctrine of the Knowledge of God,"
36, 43.
[38]Warfield, "A
Review of De Zekerheid Des Geloofs," Shorter
Writings, II: 116; cf. Warfield, "On Faith in
its Psychological Aspects," 338. On the relationship
between "the disease of sin" and Warfield's
contention that "Man as we know him is not normal
man," see Warfield, "Augustine's Doctrine of
Knowledge and Authority," 156, 158; Warfield,
"Calvin's Doctrine of the Knowledge of God,"
32, 70.
[39]Warfield,
"Augustine's Doctrine of Knowledge and
Authority," 158.
[40]Warfield,
"Calvin's Doctrine of the Knowledge of God,"
32. Cf. Warfield, "Augustine's Doctrine of Knowledge
and Authority," 155-156.
[41]Ibid., 155. Emphasis
added. On the failure of general revelation, see
Warfield, "Calvin's Doctrine of the Knowledge of
God," 39-45.
[42]Warfield, "On
Faith in its Psychological Aspects," 338, 339;
Warfield, "God and Human Religion and Morals," Shorter
Writings, I: 42; cf. Warfield, "A Review of De
Zekerheid des Geloofs," Shorter Writings,
II: 116.
[43]B. B. Warfield,
"Inability and the Demand of Faith," Shorter
Writings, II: 725; cf. Warfield, "On Faith in
its Psychological Aspects," 339.
[44]Warfield,
"Augustine and the Pelagian Controversy,"
403-404.
[45]Warfield, "God
and Human Religion and Morals," Shorter Writings,
I: 44.
[46]For an understanding
of the relationship between the inability to see revealed
truth for what it objectively is and the "infinite
variety" of "religions and moralities"
that are produced by "reprobate minds," cf.
Ibid., I: 42, 44; and my brief discussion of Warfield's
distinction between "man-made" (i.e., natural)
and "God-made" (i.e., supernatural),
"unrevealed" and "revealed" religion
in "Moral Character and Moral Certainty,"
Appendix Two.
[47]Cf. Warfield,
"Calvin's Doctrine of the Knowledge of God,"
47; Warfield, "Augustine's Doctrine of Knowledge and
Authority," 159.
[48]Ibid., 159-160.
[49]B. B. Warfield,
"Christianity and Revelation," Shorter
Writings, I: 27.
[50]Warfield,
"Calvin's Doctrine of the Knowledge of God,"
32; cf. Warfield, "Augustine's Doctrine of Knowledge
and Authority," 222.
[51]Ibid., 159, 222.
[52]Warfield,
"Calvin's Doctrine of the Knowledge of God,"
69. Warfield suggested that general and special
revelation together form an "organic whole"
which includes all that God has done - in nature,
history, and grace - to make himself known. Special
revelation, therefore, must not be regarded as that which
was given to supersede general revelation. It must be
regarded, rather, as that which was graciously provided
to meet the altered circumstances occasioned by the
advent of sin. Cf. Warfield, "Christianity and
Revelation," Shorter Writings, I: 28.
[53]Warfield,
"Augustine's Doctrine of Knowledge and
Authority," 161.
[54]Warfield,
"Calvin's Doctrine of the Knowledge of God,"
70.
[55]Ibid., 32.
[56]Warfield, "God
and Human Religion and Morals," Shorter Writings,
I: 43.
[57]Warfield, "On
Faith in its Psychological Aspects," 339. On the
relationship between regeneration and the "habits or
dispositions" that govern the activity of the soul,
cf. B. B. Warfield, "Regeneration," Shorter
Writings, II: 323; B. B. Warfield, "New
Testament Terms Descriptive of the Great Change," Shorter
Writings, I: 267-277.
[58]Warfield,
"Calvin's Doctrine of the Knowledge of God,"
111.
[59]Ibid.
[60]Warfield,
"Calvin's Doctrine of the Knowledge of God,"
33.
[61]Ibid., 79, 32,
111-112. Emphasis added.
[62]Ibid., 32, 121, 70,
79.
[63]Ibid., 31, 113; cf.
83. For my take on how Warfield's understanding of the testimonium
internum Spiritus Sancti is related to that of
Calvin, see "Moral Character and Moral
Certainty," Appendix One.
[64]Warfield,
"Calvin's Doctrine of the Knowledge of God,"
75.
[65]Cf. Warfield,
"On Faith in its Psychological Aspects,"
337-338. On the essential similarity between faith in
"renewed man" and faith in "unfallen
man," cf. 340.
[66]Warfield, review of Foundations,
325-326. Emphasis added.
[67]B. B. Warfield,
"Theology a Science," Shorter Writings,
II: 210.
[68]Warfield,
"Authority, Intellect, Heart," Shorter
Writings, II: 669. For more on how the objective and
subjective are related in "sound religion" and
"true religious thinking," and on how there is
a symbiotic relationship between religion and theology
because of the unitary operation of the soul, cf.
668-671; Warfield, "Theology a Science," Shorter
Writings, II: 210; Andrew Hoffecker, "Benjamin
B. Warfield," in The Princeton Theology,
edited by David Wells, 67; Helseth, "Moral Character
and Moral Certainty," Appendix Two.
[69]Warfield,
"Calvin's Doctrine of the Knowledge of God,"
37.
[70]B. B. Warfield,
"Apologetics," Studies in Theology, 4,
3.
[71]Jack Rogers and
Donald McKim, The Authority and Interpretation of the
Bible (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1979), 323.
[72]Warfield, "A
Review of De Zekerheid Des Geloofs," Shorter
Writings, II: 112, 114.
[73]Warfield,
"Introduction to Francis R. Beattie's Apologetics,"
Shorter Writings, II: 98.
[74]Warfield, "On
Faith in its Psychological Aspects," 318.
[75]B. B. Warfield, The
Plan of Salvation (Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board
of Publications, 1915), 59.
[76]Warfield, "A
Review of De Zekerheid Des Geloofs," Shorter
Writings, II: 120.
[77]Jack Rogers,
"Van Til and Warfield on Scripture in the
Westminster confession," in Jerusalem and Athens:
Critical Discussions on the Philosophy and Apologetics of
Cornelius Van Til, edited by E. R. Geehan
(Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1980), 154.
[78]Cornelius Van Til,
"My Credo," in Jerusalem and Athens, 11.
[79]George Marsden, Fundamentalism
and American Culture: The Shaping of Twentieth-Century
Evangelicalism 1870-1925 (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1980), 115.
[80]Warfield,
"Introduction to Francis R. Beattie's Apologetics,"
Shorter Writings, 103, 100.
[81]Ibid., II: 103.
[82]Warfield, "A
Review of De Zekerheid Des Geloofs," Shorter
Writings, II: 115.
[83]Warfield,
"Calvin's Doctrine of the Knowledge of God,"
124, note 99; Warfield, "A Review of De Zekerheid
Des Geloofs," Shorter Writings, II: 116,
115.
[84]Ibid., II: 115.
[85]Ibid., II: 116-117.
[86]Warfield,
"Introduction to Francis R. Beattie's Apologetics,"
Shorter Writings, II: 103. On the relationship
between apologetics and "historical faith," cf.
Warfield, "Calvin's Doctrine of the Knowledge of
God," 124-125, note 99; Andrew Hoffecker, Piety
and the Princeton Theologians: Archibald Alexander,
Charles Hodge, and Benjamin Warfield (Phillipsburg,
NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed; and Grand Rapids: Baker,
1981), 101-103, 108-109.
[87]Cf. Ibid., 109;
Warfield, "Introduction to Francis R. Beattie's Apologetics,"
Shorter Writings, II: 99.
[88]Ibid., II: 103.
[89]Warfield,
"Apologetics," 4.
[90]Ibid., 15.
[91] This is not to deny
the possibility that some later apologists who
misappropriated Warfield's method apart from his theology
are free from criticisms of epistemological weakness.
[92]Warfield,
"Calvin's Doctrine of the Knowledge of God,"
124, note 99.
[93]For example, see
Daniel B. Wallace, "Who's Afraid of the Holy
Spirit?" Christianity Today (September 12,
1994): 38; Ernest R. Sandeen, "The Princeton
Theology: One Source of Biblical Literalism in American
Protestantism," Church History 31 (1962):
307-319.
[94]Greg Bahnsen,
"Machen, Van Til, and the Apologetical Tradition of
the OPC," in Pressing Toward the Mark: Essays
Commemorating Fifty Years of the Orthodox Presbyterian
Church, edited by Charles Dennison and Richard Gamble
(Philadelphia: The Committee for the Historian of the
Orthodox Presbyterian Church, 1986), 263, 262-263.
[95]J. Gresham Machen to
Rev. Gerrit H. Hospers, Ontario, New York, 27 December
1924, Machen Archives, Montgomery Memorial Library,
Westminster Theological Seminary, Philadelphia. See also
Machen to Hospers, 11 December 1924.
Paul Helseth, recently completed his
PhD at Marquette University.
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